This paper explores the relations between accountability and corporate governance. Although it is a pivotal concept in many fields, accountability remains an elusive concept-close to but different from responsibility. Accountability is best understood as a norm of governance, stipulating particular modes of wielding power and of responses to power in the Hohfeldian sense of this term. Societies that endorse accountability norms in the public or private sphere expect power holders to provide full disclosure and be liable for misdeeds. Accountability is not a universal norm, however. Differences exist between Western and non-Western countries in cultural value preferences compatible with democratic accountability. Within the West, differences in corporate governance paradigmsspecifically, the prevalence of shareholder-versus stakeholder-interest norms-are consistent with prevailing value preferences, in line with political theories of corporate governance.
INTRODUCTION
A standard-and, it must be admitted, somewhat worn-out-starting point for discussing accountability and corporate governance is Milton Friedman's famous statement that "the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits".
1 It may be easy to criticize Friedman's statement as an extreme exposition of the shareholder primacy paradigm. But advancing an alternative paradigmsay, a corporate stakeholder paradigm-that would also be viable in today's global financial markets appears to be a daunting task, if not an altogether losing strategy. This debate is often cast in terms of accountability and the constituencies that corporations or corporate officers should be accountable to. I will call such constituencies "accountees". Those owing them accountability duties will therefore be called "accountables".
The goal of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of the concept of accountability and to advance a new approach for discussing accountability and corporate governance, which builds on the study of social norms. It will become evident that many of the concepts that are so often used by commentators-first and foremost is "accountability"-are actually rather poorly defined. To overcome this unsatisfactory situation, this paper engages in several definitional discussions. Even if they appear technical, I consider these discussions essential for discerning the core controversies regarding this subject.
Part 2 briefly reviews the common contexts in which accountability and corporate governance are discussed. Part 3 distills a conceptual definition of accountability in light of various sources, ranging from linguistics, to political science, to social psychology. Part 4 argues that accountability is insiders and shareholders, with more radical views that focus on relationships with other constituencies.
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Today, the shareholder primacy paradigm appears to be the dominant paradigm as a matter of law as well as of practice. 12 But the competing paradigm of stakeholder interests refuses to disappear as a normatively relevant alternative. Indeed, it may be gaining momentum. In June 1999, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its Principles of Corporate Governance. 13 The OECD Principles highlight the protection of the rights of shareholders and call for ensuring equitable treatment of all shareholders, but they also stress the importance of other stakeholders, including employees, environmental interests, and societal interests of the communities in which corporations operate. The OECD Principles were adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and also by large institutional investors such as CalPERS. 14 Finally, the language of corporate accountability today extends to global instruments on corporate responsibility intended for multinational corporations. gently." 22 People are also urged to report their deeds and confess their sins to one another. 23 Such sources are of limited help, however, because they can be construed in fundamentally different ways.
The exact form of confession, for instance, varies considerably among Christian denominations.
Catholics confess to and receive direction from a priest who is part of a hierarchically organized church; Protestants are supposed to confess to and get advice from their peers.
Reaching a sound analysis of accountability and corporate governance therefore hinges on having a sound understanding of the concept of accountability. Ad hoc or colloquial usage is simply not enough. Nor do sacred scriptures suffice for providing a universally applicable definition, although (at least) among English speakers they may invoke strong religious connotations. Students of corporate governance will readily acknowledge, moreover, that in this context, accountability does not revolve on punishment or on religious beliefs; it has to do with relationships between corporations and corporate officers and between various social constituencies. The following sections are therefore dedicated to a conceptual discussion of accountability.
Linguistic Aspects
One should note from the outset that "accountability" is not a universal concept. In fact, this word is known only in English, such that this particular notion, with all the connotations it entails, prevails primarily in English-speaking countries. When I started working on accountability and governance, I was intrigued by the fact that as a native Hebrew speaker, I was lacking a Hebrew word for accountability. An inquiry with the Academy of Hebrew Language revealed that the Academy had 22 Galatians 6:1. 23 James 5:16.
indeed considered the issue but decided not to adopt a specific translation in light of the fact that a specific term also does not exist in languages such as Russian, German, or Spanish.
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Political scientist Melvin Dubnick similarly finds that the English concept is quite distinctive.
In most of the romance languages (French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese), various forms of the term "responsibility" are used in lieu of the English accountability, which he considers an "anglican" term. 25 Northern European languages (Dutch, Danish, German), says Dubnick, use "responsibility" in a way that reflects a duty or obligation, which is at least close in meaning to accountability. Russian, however, uses a distinct term with roots in the concept of "report" through the French root "comptes a rendre". 26 Finally, a Japanese-style strategy-namely, transliterating accountability to "akauntabiritii"-may be helpful in facilitating discourse but only highlights the foreignness of the concept to certain societies.
Now it should be obvious that responsibility, obligation, answerability, and similar terms are close synonyms for accountability in English as well. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary thus stresses the element of "obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one's actions" in its definition of accountability, and the Oxford Dictionary defines "accountable" as "Liable to be called to answer for responsibilities and conduct; able to be reckoned or explained." According to Black' 26 Id., at 69-70.
Political Science
Political scientists deal with the notion of accountability perhaps most extensively. Dubnick traces the roots of the English idea (as opposed to the term) of accountability to the publication of the Domesday Book in 1086 -a watershed event in British political history. 28 The Domesday Book was commissioned in December 1085 by William the Conqueror, who invaded England in 1066. The first draft was completed in August 1086 and contained records for 13,418 settlements in the English counties south of the border with Scotland at the time. 29 Beyond its immediate purpose to assess a tax base, the conduct of the Domesday survey was an exercise in applying massive authority, as it sent a message to all of William's subjects that the conquest was complete and a new ruling order was in place.
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Beyond the Domesday surveys themselves, William I took a complementary step in 1086 to forge his royal authority, when he made all the people owning land at the time to submit to him and swear oaths of allegiance to him. The development of the feudal structure of governance in England, argues Dubnick, relied on the establishment of accountability as a mode of wielding power. Henry II, grandson of William I, preserved this system as he left much authority in local hands while tying them to the center through a strong accountability system. With the shifting of power from the Crown to Parliament in later stages, this accountability system was held in place. 31 One could say that only the 27 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (6th ed. 1990).
28 Dubnick, supra note 25, at 70-71. 29 Further information on the Domesday Books and searchable text can be found at <http://www.domesdaybook.co.uk/>. 30 Dubnick, supra note 25, at 71. 31 Id., id. identity of the accountee had changed -first it was the nobility and later still, the entire populace, with the gradual establishment of full democracy and universal suffrage in England.
English scholars' analyses of accountability focus on "ministerial responsibility", namely, accountability of the government to Parliament and the public in general. The British version of democracy relies upon an elected House of Parliament to check, control, and call to account those who exercise the executive power. 32 Accountability in this context includes both the acceptance of the responsibility publicly to explain and justify policies and a willingness to admit to and remedy errors; these obligations cannot be flouted with impunity. 33 The notion of public sector accountability in the United States carries a meaning largely similar to the English meaning. Romzek and Dubnick provide a representative description of this accountability, as follows:
"A relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for performance that involves some delegation of authority to act… [which performance is] expected by some significant "other"… accountability is a generic form of social relationship found in a variety of contexts… [A]ccountabiltiy does not necessarily imply the existence of democracy; rather, it suggests any form of governance conducted through some delegation of authority." 34 In an effort better to understand the phenomenon of accountability, writers repeatedly try to distinguish and categorize particular contexts where accountability is observed or is expected. A common classification refers to the identity of the accountable-public officials, elected politicians, etc.-and the identity of the accountee-whether it is Parliament or Congress, the media, the public, and so forth. 35 Another element used for making distinctions is the content of the accountability duty, but this element does not seem to be a critical factor since accountability is now generally understood
to be an open-textured obligation with certain core components: promoting the accountee's interests, transparency and reporting, and liability to make amends.
The political science literature is instrumental for assessing the importance, pervasiveness, and complexity of the accountability phenomenon, at least in English-speaking countries. 36 But apart from a historical account of the roots of this phenomenon, these discussions tend to abstract from the reasons that might lead to it, or, more accurately -from the motivations that may engender or hinder a prevalence of accountability in particular countries. Here, Dubnick makes an important contribution in the observation that "the condition of accountability… is ethically relevant because it subjects one to the tensions of moral pull and moral push" as the latter are defined in Robert Nozick's ethical theory.
37
Dubnick expounds a classification of four types of "accountability systems"-namely, legal, organizational, professional, and political-and associates them with "institutions of accountability" The goal of the present paper is to address precisely the issues which Dubnick leaves open both explicitly and implicitly. The next parts will put forward a conceptualization of accountability in a social norms framework that is sensitive to international cultural diversity. In addition, I will extend this conceptualization beyond the public sector sphere to the private sphere and in particular to the issue of corporate governance. accountable for their decisions. People are likely to adjust their public attitudes toward the views of the anticipated audience; they try to anticipate objections that reasonable critics might raise; they are likely to engage in self-justifying thinking about past actions that are now irreversible and implausible to deny; and they may engage in decision-evasion tactics when faced with conflicting views of potential accountees. 44 The elaborate treatment of the behavioral manifestations of accountability in current social psychological research underscores the relative terseness with which contemporary writers deal with the social contexts that might engender such manifestations. That is, when do people consider accountability an effective factor that they need to adjust to? In this respect, Lerner and Tetlock point out two (necessary and sufficient) conditions for accountability systems to arise:
Social Psychology
1. One group member acts in a manner that harms others.
2. Those harmed are sufficiently alarmed to incur the costs of monitoring and censuring. 45 These conditions define a partial set of social settings in which accountability is anticipated by both parties and may therefore affect behavior. The first condition clearly dominates the second one: absent potential harm there is no expectation for potential monitoring and censuring. Moreover, one may question the relevance of the second condition altogether in light of Tetlock and Lerner's assertion that self-accountability could also be considered. 46 
Accountability as a Social Norm
Readers will not be surprised to learn at this point that like "accountability", the term "social norms" also has different definitions in different disciplines. So much so, that Dean Scott recently argued that "the academic debate [on social norms] currently suffers from conceptual pluralism and terminological disarray. Indeed, we lack even a basic consensus on the proper definition of a social norm. This tower of Babel quality is, in part, a reflection of the complexity of the social phenomena 47 Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 40, at 2, 10. affect individual behavior. 56 The sources of social norms vary from general societal expectations for one's behavior to one's own expectations for one's behavior.
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Policy makers and lawyers are more concerned with injunctive norms than with descriptive norms: The former norms actually carry a "normative bite" in that they guide human behavior. In other words, injunctive norms are conceptually equivalent to what legal scholars refer to as "ought"
statements. 58 Perceiving accountability as a social norm therefore means that societal members share the view that certain people should be held accountable to others. Where a social norm of accountability prevails, the accountables, the accountees, and society at large all expect the former to behave accountably -namely, to promote the accountees' interests, to fully disclose their personal interests, to be responsible for wrongdoings, and so forth. 58 See Mitchell, supra note 50, at 180 ("The key to understanding norms -the process of their formation, their content, and their stability -is to understand that norms are 'ought' statements."); Cooter, supra note 50, at 588 ("a person will pay a net price to uphold an internal obligation."); Etzioni, supra note 50, at 161 ("[S]ocial norms are not merely part of the actors' environment but also affect their intrinsic predispositions…These predispositions reflect a combination of people's biological urges and their cultural imprinting. ") further entails that it is not necessarily a universal norm, prevailing in a every society. Quite the contrary. Certain societies may not consider accountability a desirable social norm, while other societies may uphold it only in a limited set of social settings. Consider the United States. The picture portrayed by Robert Behn is of a society deeply engaged in holding people in the public service accountable: "Being in the accountability-holding business can be fun…The accountability holders themselves don't have to do anything particularly right… What a wonderful profession!" 60 At the same time, the debate over whether corporations and corporate officers should be accountable to nonshareholder constituencies has been raging for decades without showing signs that it is about to get settled.
Accountability as a Norm of Governance
Accountability belongs to an important category of social norms that may collectively be called "norms of governance". 61 Norms of governance prescribe legitimate modes of wielding power-that is, they deal with use and abuse of power. As a norm of governance, accountability implies that accountables hold positions of power and accountees are subject to the use of that power. Because accountability is not a universal norm, only societies that subscribe to this norm expect people in power positions to follow the norm's basic rules. Other societies may regulate the wielding of power through different social norms.
The preceding set of arguments calls for a precise explication of the notion of power. Such explication may be obtained by turning to Wesley Hohfeld's seminal analysis of fundamental legal 59 Ellickson, supra note 50, at 3. 60 Behn, supra note 16, at 5. 61 See Licht, supra note 50.
conceptions. 62 Writing in the 1910s, Hohfeld was frustrated with the inadequacy of contemporary legal discussions of legal rights, especially with respect to trusts. His primary endeavor was "to 'think straight' in relation to all legal problems" and to analyze "the basic conceptions of the law,-the legal elements that enter into all types of jural interests." 63 Hohfeld advanced an elegant diagrammatic model of relationships between legal statuses, mostly famous among them are rights, duties, and privileges.
This model also specifies a dyadic relationship between "power" and "liability" that can shed light on the present discussion.
The "person (or persons)", states Hohfeld, "whose volitional control is paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to affect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in the problem." 64 "Liability" is simply a correlative concept of power, denoting the status of the other party as subject to the first party's power ("subjection" might have thus been a better title). "Disability" denotes lack of power; while "immunity" denotes the opposite sense of liability-namely, being immune to the exercise of power. 65 When one strips Hohfeld's definition of the "legal" adjectives (something that Hohfeld himself alludes to in the above excerpt) and generalizes it to all social relationships, this model in my mind holds the key for understanding the notion of power, and hence, the notions of governance and accountability. 64 Id., at 44. 65 Id., at 53.
To illustrate the working of his model, Hohfeld provides two telling examples of legal powers.
The first example concerns an agency relationship. "The creation of an agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative liabilities in the principal."
66 Once the agency relationship is created, the agent has the power to convey the principal's property, assume or discharge debt to be paid from the principal's property, and so forth. However, Hohfeld carefully notes that the agent's power in fact stems from the principal's power to create agency power in the agent in the first place. The second example concerns the common law liabilities of persons engaged in "public callings"-the old, private predecessors of public service providerssuch as innkeepers and common carriers. These people have a liability toward the general public -a liability they can extinguish, together with the correlative powers of the public, only by going out of business. Once again, the reason for this seemingly harsh arrangement lies in these people having a reciprocal holding-out power over members of the public.
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Against this backdrop, consider now the notion of governance. "Governance" is a relatively recent term that has become popular since the mid-1990s, inter alia, as a result of "good governance"
programs sponsored by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
These bodies share an operational agenda on promoting the rule of law and accountability and fighting corruption with a view to fostering economic development. The definition adopted for governance is thus compatible with this agenda:
"We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources and 66 Id., at 46. implement sound policies, and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them."
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For these international bodies, governance is a feature characterizing the public sector and the public sphere in general. Limiting the definition of governance to the public sphere, however, renders it unnecessarily narrow. 69 Governance comprises all the arrangements that regulate the wielding of power. In the private sphere-as in "corporate governance"-governance also consists of rules and structures for wielding power over other people's interests-that is, for tackling agency problem.
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Recall that Hohfeld had treated both agency and public callings as relationships involving power and subjection to power (liability). Hohfeld's approach underscores the seamlessness between public and private interactions that involve exercise of power. "In passing," notes Hohfeld, "it may be well to observe that the term "authority," so frequently used in agency cases, is very ambiguous and slippery in its connotation."
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Returning to the social norm of accountability, such a norm calls for and establishes feedback channels between parties to power relationships. As already noted, these channels include the obligation to give an account of decisions or actions, to explain or justify them, and so forth. A closer analysis of this norm reveals that it implies two reciprocal power relationships, in accord with 67 Id., at 52. Hohfeld's model. First, there exists the more obvious power held by the party who is consequently held accountable. Second, it is also assumed, implicitly, that an inverse power/authority relationship had existed and that that power had been delegated to, or entrusted with, the current power holder. Hence the strict accountability duties of trustees in Anglo-American law and the frequent depictions of holders of public office as trustees of the public, or of executives as trustees of shareholders or corporations.
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Depicting accountability as a norm of governance is consistent with the central elements of accountability as these elements are identified by political scientists and social psychologists. Recall that in political science, accountability is discussed primarily with regard to the public sector.
Accountables presumably hold a public office, have public authority, and control public funds that need to be used for the benefit of the general public or some other general interest. They therefore have the power to affect the prospects of these public interests either beneficially or adversely. Similarly, the pivotal element in Lerner and Tetlock's definition of accountability systems is the ability of the accountable to harm other members of the group. To be able to harm someone is to have power over that person's interests. Having distilled a conceptual definition of governance and accountability, the present analysis thus integrates the various disciplinary approaches to these notions.
Accountability constitutes part of a large repertoire of governance norms. The types of power covered by norms of governance vary greatly. They range from long-term positions of power held by the state itself or state organs, to holding a public office. This continuum goes on to holding an executive office in a corporation and to short-term, fleeting situations that allow for opportunistic behavior. Typical short-term situations occur, for instance, during sequential performance of 71 Hohfeld 1913, supra note 62, at 46. contractual obligations, or when performance is unobservable or unverifiable-the core feature of the agency relationship. Accountability differs, however, from more general norms in that the actual content of this norm-to wit, the exact obligations owed by the accountable party-may vary considerably with the circumstances even within the same country. Although similar in principle, the accountability of elected politicians differs from that of civil servants. These types of accountability differ from the accountability of corporate executives, and so forth.
The Non-Universality of Accountability
To conclude the conceptual analysis in the present and preceding parts, let us revisit the question whether, or in what sense, is accountability a universal norm of governance. The uniqueness of the term "accountability" to the English language indirectly suggests that it may not be universal.
Prominent students of accountability agree that diversity in accountability norms and practices among nations is at least as common as it is within nations -seemingly in tension with the notion that accountability is a universal phenomenon. As noted above, Lerner and Tetlock contend that accountability rules and conventions "vary dramatically from one culture and time to another". Yet these writers also argue that accountability is "a universal feature of social life that inevitably arises from the norm-enforcement needs of groups and organizations" and that it constrains "virtually every decision people make." Virtually the same difficulty can be observed in Romzek and Dubnick's analysis, which practically identifies "accountability" with "governance": "[Accountability] suggests any form of governance conducted through some delegation of authority." 77 Moreover, while Dubnick separately 74 Semin & Manstead, supra note 41, at 156-57. 75 Id., at 175. 76 Among other things, there have been considerable advances in psychological research since Semin and Manstead's literature review. 77 Romzek & Dubnick, supra note 34, at 6. makes a compelling case for the cultural contingency of accountability, as noted above, Romzek and Dubnick, in an attempt to advance a general model of accountability, extend the boundaries of "accountability" such that it essentially overlaps with "responsibility." 78 In my view, any treatment of accountability that goes beyond using it as a catch-all phrase and focuses on its core duties must acknowledge the possibility that it is not a universal norm of governance.
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
In what way is accountability associated with national culture? How might these associations affect corporate governance? This Part draws on theories of cultural value dimensions in cross-cultural psychology to suggest answers to these questions. In general, I will argue that societies, that emphasize pursuit of individual preferences and view individual persons as equal, are more to likely to uphold norms of accountability because these norms establish a more transparent environment such that societal members would be able to better plan their independent moves. In contrast, societies that put less emphasis on these values will accommodate power wielding in ways that compromise interests of individual persons.
The Cultural Value Dimension Framework
During the last two decades, values have emerged as a major focus of cross-cultural research such that most of the currently popular models of cultural variation rest upon analyses of value 78 Id., id. ("The answers to those questions [how to delegate authority] have varied from society to society over time. The common thread running through all societies is the development of institutionalized accountability relationships that focus on what is expected of the agent who is given assigned tasks and how the agent's actions are overseen. These relationships are found in tribal societies and ancient empires, in Eastern civilizations and in the West, and in modern democratic regimes as well as in totalitarian ones.") differences. 79 
Accountability in General
The cultural value dimension framework provides means for a systematic comparative analysis of various phenomena and their relations with national culture. Elsewhere I have argued that this framework appears promising for comparative analysis of corporate governance systems and of social norms, including norms of governance. 89 The "ought" statements expressed by social norms in every society are unlikely to vary randomly with regard to one another. A more plausible view of social norms considers them an ordered system-that is, a set of interrelated and interactive elements that 87 Schwartz, supra note 79, at 26-28. Schwartz theorizes further about the relations between these value types. See id., at 28-30. 88 Schwartz notes that in modern societies Harmony may be better conceptualized as referring to non-assertiveness in social relations as submission to the environment is uncommon in contemporary national cultures. Id., at 28 n. 4. work together to accomplish specific purposes. 90 A convenient depiction of the interrelations among social norms is one of a pyramidal structure, analogous to Hans Kelsen's theory on the pyramid of legal norms. 91 In this view, each society upholds a limited number of fundamental, deeply rooted social norms. These norms serve as the foundation, or backbone, for a large body of normative prescriptionsboth legal and non-legal norms (i.e., social norms).
Norms of governance, I submit, constitute a significant part of societies' pyramids of social norms. Relationships of power and subjection are ubiquitous in every society. Such relationships often have economic implications. One can therefore expect to find a common thread running through norms that regulate various setting of power wielding. Although such norms are unlikely to be identical, the systems view of social norms implies that they should have common features. The value dimension framework allows one to articulate in well-defined terms hypotheses about cultural stances on wielding of power. Societal preferences can be associated with relative emphases on value dimensions. As a first-cut approximation, norms of governance that prevail in societies high on Autonomy (or Individualism) are likely to differ systematically from norms that prevail in societies whose dominant values belong to the Embeddedness (or Collectivism) value types.
The core duties of accountability-candid reporting and liability to make amends-mostly resonate with values of Autonomy. Prevailing norms of accountability establish feedback channels between the people in power positions and those subject to this power-namely, the accountables and 89 See, respectively, Licht, supra note 14; Licht, supra note 50. the accountees. Egalitarianism too reflects a general view that both parties stand on equal footing and deserve consideration. Egalitarianism further manifests itself in societal emphasis on responsibility, a close (albeit partial) synonym for accountability, although it does not indicate how such responsibility is to be discharged. Hierarchy, however, may have ambiguous implications. Societies high on Hierarchy encourage people to respect (or pursue) authority and respond to it with humility. On the one hand, Hierarchy could connote disregard toward people on the liability side of power relationships; on the other hand, recall that accountability characterizes power relationships that are sometimes perceived as bilateral, such that an emphasis on Hierarchy could lead to mutual respect between the parties.
It should be emphasized at this point that accountability is not a "nice" style of governance. As Robert Behn lucidly illustrates, it is not fun to be on the receiving end of accountability, i.e., to be accountable. Dubnick's historiography of this concept suggests why this is the case: Accountability some of these differences but does not eliminate them.
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If one extrapolates from these finding to accountability in general, then they support the notion that in non-Western countries, accountability is not a prevailing norm of governance. This reality, moreover, is associated with the cultural values upheld in these countries. Now it must be stressed that the latter interpretation does not mean that all the non-Western countries necessarily lack norms of governance or any governance institutions at all. Quite likely, at least some of these countries have other types of governance norms. All that can be argued in light of the theory and evidence mentioned 95 See Schwartz, supra note 79. 96 We repeat these tests for cultural regions identified by Hofstede in 1980. The results are consistent with, albeit somewhat less clear-cut than, the results for Schwartz's regions. so far is that accountability is a style of governance that appears incompatible with cultural profiles of many countries.
Accountability and Corporate Governance
Hohfeldian power relationships are inherent to the very nature of business corporations.
Corporations are run by agents; corporations aggregate investors' financial capital with employees' human capital and invest them in risky projects, only hoping to generate positive returns; corporations conduct operations that could harm third parties or the environment. Societies all around the world have adopted the legal/conceptual idea of the separate entity of corporations. Even critics of Hansmann and Kraakman's end-of-history thesis will concede to their statement that:
"We must begin with the recognition that the law of business corporations had already achieved a remarkable degree of worldwide convergence at the end of the nineteenth century. By that time, largescale business enterprise in every major commercial jurisdiction had come to be organized in the corporate form, and the core functional features of that form were essentially identical across these After all, corporate governance is the framework that defines the division of wealth and power in the corporation.
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In its pure form, the shareholder wealth maximization paradigm-we may call it a social norm at this point-takes a clear-cut position in giving shareholders the superior accountee status and subordinating other constituencies' interests to them. 112 Managers' accountability is owed only to shareholders while other constituencies do not enjoy it. This paradigm therefore reflects a combination of Autonomy with Hierarchy. In contrast, the stakeholder paradigm requires corporations and their managements constantly to juggle between conflicting interests in an effort to avoid extreme harm to any one of them, inevitably at the expense of some constituencies. This paradigm thus reflects a context. This is because no difference are observed between the two cultural regions in their scores on democratic accountability -an unsurprising result given that all the countries in both regions have democratic regimes. France, Germany, Italy, and Scandinavia, but also for the rise of the public firm in the United States.
Social democracies do not strongly control public firm agency costs because they do not want unbridled shareholder-wealth maximization, and, hence, by weakening shareholder-wealth maximization institutions, they widen the gap between managers and dispersed stockholders. When the gap is wide enough, the large American-style public firm is rendered unstable." 122 Tempting as it may be, I would advocate avoiding a chicken-or-egg discussion of "which came first: culture or politics?" With regard to accountability and corporate governance, the two are obviously interrelated. Social democracy emerged in Western Europe after World War II but builds on cultural emphases that had developed during the preceding two centuries. In the United States, English colonizers and settlers probably brought with them basic notions of accountability, but the rise of the large business corporations, together with the frontier experience and the influence of slavery likely affected the American cultural profile.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to explore the relations between accountability and corporate governance. To accomplish this task I found it necessary to take the reader through several definitional exercises, which, at the very least, point out the breadth and diversity of the issues. My main goal was to present a well-defined framework that can integrate cultural aspects into current analyses of accountability and corporate governance, as the latter tend to concentrate on economic and political economic analyses. The value dimension framework addresses the somewhat dismissive attitude among certain students of comparative corporate governance toward the role of social norms in this context. 124 The extant research indicates that this framework can yield observations that are compatible with other disciplinary approaches yet shed new light on them.
